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/ The Atlantic Alliance in its Fourth Decade 
Some days ago as I prepared my speech I asked a colleague: 
"Are you going abroad this summer?", and he answered: "No, 
what's the use of travelling around among people who don't 
speak my language, and who couldn't vote for me even if they 
wanted to?" 
As fQr the language: I intend to speak your language, that· 
is, the language of facts which I believe will be well 
understood in this great city of Houston and in this marvellous 
lone star state of Texas. And as for your difficulties 
voting for me: the responsibility of a politician whose 
country belongs to an Alliance does not stop at the borders 
of his constituency. That's why I am here with you in order 
to discuss the present situation and th~ goals of the Alliance 
which unites our peoples. 
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany adopted in 
1949 begins with a list of basic rights. On the whole they 
are modelled after the Constitution of the United States of 
America. For it was in that Constitution that a list of 
basic rights for the individual was laid down for the first 
time in the history of mankind. 
Since 1949 we have sided with the nations which regard the 
freedom of the individual and the inviolability of his . 
person as the prerequisite for democracy. And we belong to 
an alliance whose. members are ready to defend these freedoms 
with their lives. 
The Alliance - a Success Story 
A few decades ago Henry Kissinger wrote a book on the Allianqe 
entitled."The troubled partnership". He used to tell people ! 
that the book had not sold particularly well -with the· 
exception of a shop in Washington where it had accidentally 
been placed on the shelf for books dealing with family 
problems. 
Differences within the Alliance are, therefore, not a novelty. 
They have always existed. We must regard such differences in 
their true light: as disputes within a family. 
Moreover, despite its crises the Alliance is a success story 
because its policy and that of its members has always been 
adjusted to the changing conditions of East-West relations 
and has thus now prevented war in Europe for over thirty 
years. 
This succe.ss has not simply fallen into our laps. It is the 
outcome of a succession of problems, differences and crises. 
But we would be committing a grave error if we concentrated 
our attention on these family crises only. 
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There are, after all, problems that give us much greater 
cause for concern. At present the world is in a twofold 
crisis. There'is a politicial crisis, which is marked by 
serious setbacks and the threat of instability in East~West 
relations as well as dangerous troublespots in the Third 
World. At the same time, however, we are all - that is, the 
West, the East and the Third World - experiencing a serious 
world economic crisis. 
It is obvious today that no country, no nation can resolve 
the world's problems alone. Not the problems of war and 
peace, poverty and prosperity, ecology or overpopulation, 
and certainly not world economic problems. · 
If I m~y just mention those problems: in almost all industrial 
countr1es the highest unemployment rates since the great 
depression in the early 30s; the highest real interest rates 
ever during a recession, indeed the highest in the United 
States since the time of the Civil War. This high level of 
interest strangulates investment in fixed capital and in 
house construction. And at the beginning of the whole chain ~ftcauses are huge budget deficits which freeze money rrarket 
n erest rates at an astronomical height. 
In the light o~ t~ese two crises, which are hassling us both 
at the same time,·western Europe and North_America hav~ a 
common responsibility not only for the people in the Atlantic 
region but also for the future of the whole world. We must 
therefore stick together. 
Here in your city of Houston in the state of Texas decisions , 
are taken that also have a bearing on the future of. the 
world. As you all well know, oil may be a lubricant, but it 
is not in international affairs. 
Defence Efforts 
The prime task of the Atlantic Alliance is to guara~tee our 
security. 
In so doin· three decisive changes in the East-West balance 
of power must be borne in mind: 
1. In the last twenty years the Soviet Union has made 
enormous efforts to expand its conventional 
military potential. · 
2. By developing "its fleet the Soviet Union has 
become a global sea power. 
3. In the field of strategic.nuclear. weapons the 
Soviet Union has achieved parity with the United 
States. By rapidly expanding its intermediate-
range nuclear potential it· has created a further 
strategic threat to Western Europe. Each of the 
now more than 300 SS-20 missiles has three war-
heads, which means that one missile can destroy 
with one single strike my home city of Hamburg and 
the neighbouring cities of Lubeck and Riel. 
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The Western Alliance must seek to counter by military means 
this Soviet arms build-up. This is possible oply through co-
operation between North America and Western Europe. We 
Europeans know that without the United States ' nuclear 
potential and without American· troops in Europe there can be 
no equilibrium between East and West. 
. . 
But it also means there would be no equilibrium without the 
500,000 well-trained soldiers of"the German armed forces 
with their top-grade equipment~ which would be supplemented 
in the event of a crisis by a further 750,000 fully-trained 
German reservists both·of whom are extremely efficient, and 
that is the Soviet yiew too. If NATO, which in Europe is 
always under the command of an American gen·eral, had to 
counter an attack tomorrow, 90 per cent of the ground forces 
and 75 per cent of the sea and air forces available from the 
outset would be Western European· soldiers. 
In this connection allow me to make a few r~marks·which I 
consider to be of fundamental importance. In most recent 
years the interest of the leadership stratum in your country 
in Europe's specific problems, including those of my own 
country, appears to have been, if anything~ diminishing. The 
number of those Congressmen and Senators who maintained ·a 
dialogue with us Germans at relatively short intervals, 
people we knew well and with whom we were able to develop a 
reliable personal relationship over a good many years, has. 
decreased. 
Many of your parliamentarians today are tending to look 
inwards. I am not reproaching them for that, but we have 
observed along with this phenomenon that certain prefabricated 
clich~ concepts of u~ Germans are gaitiing ground which are 
today proving detrimental to our relationship. And I mean 
not only the relationship between our governments in Washing-
ton and Bonn. There is, for instance, the one about the. 
Germans having become so self-centred about their prosperity 
that they would rather concentrate their resources on 
increasing that prosperity rather ~han on necessary efforts 
to strengthen and modernize the common Western defence •. 
The truth is that neither such a large and wealthy country 
as yours nor a medium-sized one like the Federal Republic of 
Germany can invest as much money in its defence budget as 
some of our generals and defence ministers deem necessary. 
Some defence.experts tend to underestimate from time to time 
what economic and social stability in our Weste~n democracy 
mean. That stability is in fact.the cruc~al prerequisite for. 
the defensive capability-and the-defensive will of our open, 
our free societies. 
I have already spoken about the size of our armed .forces. As 
you know, we adhere to the system of compulsory military 
service, although it would be much more convenient·, par-:-
ticularly in our discussions with the yo~nger generation, 
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also in Germany, to discontinue. the draft, as you did ten 
years ago, and have an army ot regular soldiers. From 1970 
to 1981, the Federal Republic has on average increased its 
defence spending by almost 3 per_ cent in real terms annually. 
In about the same period US expenditure fell by almost 2 per 
cent a year. I should point out that on account of the 
recession the rate of growth of·, our 1983 budget will be no 
more than 1.9 per cent •. Co~ared to that, our defence minister's 
budget will be the only'~one to .. ;i-ncrease, and that by 4. 1 · 
per cent. So you will undersiari~ that· it is not easy for me 
to present this to the voting public at home since it means 
we have to expect our· citizens 'to make co.nsiderable sacrifices 
in the field of. social welfare. -
Only a few months ago, on 15 April to be exact, our Foreign 
Minister and your Ambassador in Bonn, Arthur Burns, signed 
an agreement on wartime host nation,support. This is further 
proof that our defence policy will continue to be based on 
the philosophy of burden-sharing. There will be no change in 
this. . 
Nor will we do anything that might fuel .the argume~~s of 
Senator Mike Mansfield!s successors who demand a redu~tion 
of American forces in Germany. Quite ·apart from the factJr 
that every well-informed citizen of your country knows very 
well that the GI~ from Texas and California serving in good 
old Germany have not been stationed there because you li·ke 
the colour of our eyes. They are there to ·help defend genuine 
American security interests as well in case of necessity. 
American soldiers are very welcome guests in our country. 
But no one should forget what this concentration of troops 
and weapons means to a country like ·the Federal Republic. My 
country is only one third the size of the state of Texas,· 
but it has five times as many people- over sixty million. 
. I .· ·- : 
And stationed in this densely populated territory are 
soldiers from seven nations: Afilericans, Canadians, Britons, 
French, Dutch, Belgians and Gernians - altogether nearly one 
million. And in addition nearly· 5,000 American nuclear 
warheads are stockpiled the~~:~ almost as many as in the 
whole of the United States. 
·• ~. 
These are facts. The critics, most of whom are inadequately 
informed, can come to our country and see for themselves. 
They will notice that we too,·of _course, are having a hard 
time meeting the rising cost.o~ the defence effort, that not 
all young men are dying to be drafted into the forces, and 
that our generals cannot ~lway~' afford the most modern 
military systems and not always as quickly as they would 
like. But ~hey would also not~ that we contribute to the 
Alliance's collective defenqe·a highly modern, well-motivated 
and well-trained army which.certainly need not fear comparison 
with other armed forces. 
/ 
• 
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The United States can count on us to continue to make our 
contribution to the preservation of a military balance, just 
as we count on the United States. 
Equilibrium means that inferiority cannot be accepted, but 
at the same time there is no aspiration to superiority. We 
are agreed on this principle in the Western Alliance, but 
the question still arises today: How much is enough? 
We must not underrate our own capabilities. I have no time 
for a Western military inferiority complex. It merely un-
settles our servicemen·. What, after all, can one expect of 
soldiers who are told frequently enough in political speeches 
that they are hopelessly infer~or and supporting a lost 
cause - quite apart from the fact that this is just not 
true? 
Disarmament Negotiations 
Military equilibrium is indispensable. But arms alone 
cannot reliably guarantee our security. Only codified 
equilibrium, which is negotiated between East and West and 
subject to verification, can produce stability. For th'at 
reason I have always been in favour of SALT I, SALT II and· 
START - whether in the days of Presidents Nixon, .Ford, 
Carter or now und'er· Ronald Reagan. The lower the number of 
weapons 'or troops on which equilibrium is agreed, the 
better. 
For the Federal Republic of Germany, but also for the other 
allies, codified equilibrium is the true goal of their 
security PC?licy. 
It is to President· Reagan's personal credit that he has 
committed his Administration to this basic course of the 
Alliance's common secur-ity policy. Shol!'tly before his 
inauguration in the winter of 1980, the President assured me 
that the allies could be sure that "we will negotiate, 
negotiate and negotiate". 
In the meantime this has evolved into a comprehensive 
programme for disarmament. Since November 1981 the United 
States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating in Geneva 
on intermediate-range nuclear weapons; since June 1982 the 
START talks on intercontinental strategic weapons have been 
in progress·. 
These are all difficult negotiations. But the people in my 
country expect progress to be made and arms to be limited. 
My Government is relying on the American negotiators taking 
advantage of every opportunity to arrive at agreed equilib-
rium. · 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, as in other Western 
European countries and in the United States, peace rallies 
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are being held. We take seriously the moral force behind 
this movement because our policy is also marked by the 
concer~ fQr peace. But because we want to preserve peace and 
maintain our freedom we, too, have some critical questions 
to ~sk. I share the concern for peace as reflected in.the 
demonstrations; I respect many of the convictions that are 
held by the demonstrators; but I ardently challenge the 
claim that unilateral disarmament can ever achieve the goal 
of secure peace in freedom. 
East~West Policy 
Succes~ful efforts for arms control could render a decisive 
contribution towards a more constructive East-west relation-
ship. · 
The Soviet Union•s military intervention in Afghanistan, 
Soviet intimidation of the Polish leadership and other acts, 
constitute a serious blow to East-West relations. To us 
Weste~n Europeans, this setback has been particularly 
painful because we live directly adjacent to the Soviet 
sphere of influence. 
My house in Hamburg is only 50 miles away from the front 
Soviet military ~inel 
In the United States some people have fastened onto an 
erroneous cliche to the effect that the Germans have for 
some time seemed reluctant to face up to the Soviet Union's 
violation of human rights in its spher~ of influence. It 
is_maintained that we no longer have the guts to face the 
struggl'e between freedom and democracy and the corrirnunist 
system, that in order to make things easier for .ourselves we 
have reached an accommodation with the powerful Soviet 
Union, we have concluded agreements with her to our own 
advant~ge, and that we have flirted with neutralistic ideas 
more~oi~l~ss openly. 
But the;·.facts are different. Hardly any other nation was 
required after the War to commit itself to the same extent 
as our~el 1s in the struggle between democracy and com- · 
munism. 
Thre~ and a half decades after the war, the River Elbe still 
divides· our country and our people. Throughout this long 
period we have many times had to respond to the challenge of 
com~unl.sm. We Germans have taken an unequivocal stand, both 
spiritci~lly and politically, in the face of that challenge. 
In d~m6cr~tic elections held in Ge~many in those three and 
a half .decades, the communists have been defeated time and 
time .again. From the time of the Berlin blockade up to the 
erection .of the wall in 1961, which divides the .. city of 
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Berlin in two and separates the Berliners from each other, 
in those long years of the cold war, we have not simply 
carried the burdens and the risks passively. 
You may be interested to hear what one of your correspondents 
wrote oh his return from a visit to Berlin. Let me quote: 
"Detente too is important for reasons Americans should try 
to understand, One need only visit the Friedrichstrasse 
subway station in East Berlin on a Sunday afternoon to 
begin. This is the spo~ where visiting West Germans are met, 
and hugged, by their trapped relatives in the East. Detente 
in the form of the 1972 four-power agreement on Berlin -
made it possible for these people to see each other, call 
each other on the telephone, and know that traffic in and 
out ~f West Berlin would not be halted. The Germans also are 
conv1nced that detente made possible Solidarity in Poland 
economic relaxation in Hungary, and a profound anti-Marxi~t 
cynicism in East Germany. They want the process to inch 
forward, and possibly transform the East bloc over decades~ 
They were afraid Solidarity would push too fast and produce 
a crackdown all over the East and blood in the streets of 
Poland". · 
We have again and a9ain stood up of our own free will and 
with unrelenting determination for the democ+atic way of, 
life and for those values which we have adopted from the 
American Constitution. And speaking as a Social Democrat, 
let me add that my party in particular has been in the front 
line in the political and intellectual struggle with communism. 
If on various occasions recently I have warned that the : 
West, by its own conduct, is aiding and abetting a return to 
the cold war, I certainly did not do so because we think the 
possibilities of detente are unlimited or because we have 
lapsed into wishful thinking. But I am convinced that in 
view of the huge nuclear arsenals in East and West peace 
cannot be made safer by confrontation. I am also convinced 
that genuine security, particularly for the Europeans, 
cannot be achieved in opposition to the Soviet Union. A 
reliable state of balance can only be achieved by means of 
partnership based on treaties, by means of co-operation. 
It is nonsense for some people in America to.~uspect that 
this concept amounts to equidistance, that is to say an 
attempt by the Germans to dissociate themselves from the 
indissoluble community of values of the West and to place 
their relations with the Soviet Union.on a pa~, politically 
and morally, with their relations with the .'IJ•)i'~l!."· :· · •. ~'. . • 
Such insinuations are a mark of ignorance, sometimes malice. 
The overwhelming majority of Germans wish to preserve the 
close and friendly relations with America. That majority. is 
totally immune to any form of neutralism, and it is immune 
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to anti-Western nationalism. These are facts which are 
confirmed year in, year out, by Gallup polls. 
In July 1980, on my visit to the Soviet Union, I told 
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev about our concern over the 
excessive Soviet build-up of medium-range nuclear missiles. 
I told him that as a young officer I took part in the war 
which extended right up to the gates of Moscow and claimed 
twenty million Soviet and five million German lives, and 
that he could believe me when I said that our policy stemmed 
from concern for the preservation of peace. Mr Brezhnev 
believed that, just as l believed that his own concern for 
peace is genuine. 
I am telling you this because in spite of all the contrasts, 
in spite of all the irreconcilability of the communist 
syste~ and our democratic ideals, there is no other way of 
secur1ng lasting peace than through mutual agreement and 
confidence-building. This means we have to pursue policies 
based on mutual tolerance and on agreements, a policy aimed 
at a consistent renunciation of force and at a partnership 
of security supported by treaties and aimed at a stable 
balance. 
The overstocked nuclear arsenals are making people afraid. 
The lack of success in the disarmament negotiations are a 
source of growing scepticism among young people in par-
ticular towards political leaders in our country and here tn 
America. 
The atrocities of the Second World War and the lessons it 
has taught us are today more vividly present in the minds of 
the Europeans than they were but a few years ago. Large 
sections of our young people who are seeking effective · 
disarmament demonstrate for fear of a conflict the outcome 
of which cannot be foreseen. They do not want to subjugate 
themselves to the one who is strongest. They want peace and 
freedom. What they certainly do not want is the peace of the 
graveyard. 
To sum up: we Germans do not wish by any means to under-
estimate or detract from the importance of the military 
potential 'of tl· ~ Soviet Union and of its strategy, the prime 
purpose of whi ... is to separate the Europeans from the 
Americans. But neither do we want to paint the Soviet Union 
as a demon. I do not regard the Soviet Union as a giant 
against whom·we are helpless. 
Not only the two superpowers must be calculable for one 
another. We Europeans, too, and especially we Germans 
situated on the intersection of the two all~ances, have a 
vital intere~t in seeing that interdependence is developed 
into mutual advantage, in ensuring that the mistrust between 
the members of the two alliances is gradually red~ced. 
One has to realize, 'and each side should make this an 
essential part of its political calculation, that neither 
can down the other by exerting military pressure or by 
resorting to the methods of economic starvation. Anyone who 
( 
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tries that will give rise to incalculable risks, also for 
the peoples of Eastern Europe who are so desperate for 
gradual internal reform. Pressures exerted on the other 
side - as we have already seen - provoke fears and, as a 
consequence of those fears, a new hardening of positions. 
Because ·a dialogue is needed I am very glad that President 
Reagan is considering a meeting with Mr Brezhnev. In my view 
it is a contribution to crisis management if the leaders of 
the two most powerful nations in the world meet personally 
and talk to one another. 
Even in this continuing _crisis of East-West relations, the 
maintenance of a policy of East-West co-operation geared to 
the principle of mutual advantage does not constitute appease-
ment. After all, this policy serves our Western interests. 
On his visit to Europe in June, President Reagan also went 
to Berlin. There he said: "We believe that progress for just 
and lasting peace can be made; that substantial areas of 
agreement can be reached with potential adversaries; when 
the forces of freedom act with firmness, unity and a sincere 
willingness to negotiate". · 
I fully agree with him. 
World economic crisis 
Our defence capability, our readiness for East-West co-
operation, and our capacity for bringing stability to the 
Third World are dependent on economic and sociaL stability 
being preserved in the West. The stability.of our national 
economies is a principal strategic factor. 
At the present time, this principal factor is being threatened 
in an alarming manner. I am referring to the exorbitant 
budgetary deficits which in many countries have already 
become a customary ingredient of the national economic 
policy mix. 
In my recent talks with President Reagan I have become aware 
of the difficulties confronting the Administration in the 
field of budgetary policy. However, one of _the dominating 
factors of the world economic situation is that the budget 
deficit of the United States was as late as 1978 26 billion 
dollars, tha~ of the Federal Republic 28 billion marks. 
Today, in 1982, the Federal Republic's deficit has risen to 
34 billion marks, but that bf the United States has catapulted 
beyond 100 billion dollars - an increase of over 300 percent. 
This puts pressure on credit markets. This pressure, coupled 
with the aim of controlling inflation, drive interest rates 
to unprecedented heights - with all the well-known consequences 
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for investment activity. Hardly any productive investment 
can compete with the returns to be made on investments on 
the money market. There is hardly a consumer who can afford 
loans or mortgages at such rates. The outcome is: a decline 
of investment in fixed capital, almost a complete standstill 
in housing construction, a fall in demand for almost all 
goods - from steel for building via automobiles to household 
appliances. 
But this leads to high unemployment which is compounded by 
structural changes in .the economy. 
If we do not stop allowing this fatal downward spiral to 
continue there is a great danger of the recession leading to 
a world economic depression - the second in this century, 
and one which could have just as serious consequences as the 
first. 
Such a depression would seriously weaken not only North 
America, but also Europe and South America - and at the same 
time present opportunities for Soviet infiltration. Here 
lies the responsibility which a national economy like that 
of the United States, which is so decisive for the world 
economy, must recognize and live up to. The stability ~f our 
peace and our freedom today is decided not solely by our 
defence capability and our willingness to negotiate, but 
also by our economic discernment and our financial good · 
sense. 
East-West economic relations 
At the Versailles and Bonn economic summits the Western heads 
of government laid down certain principles for East-West · 
economic relations. According to these principles, economic 
relations should be based on the idea of mutual advantage. 
Financial relations should be restricted as required by 
commercial prudence and Eastern access to Western technology 
of military importance should be limited •. We found it 
all the easier to subscribe to these principles since. they 
have at all times determined the policy pursued by the Fed-
eral Government. 
The Federal ~dpublic's trade with the East, especially with 
the Soviet Union, has often been wrongly assessed in the United 
States. It.is certainly not of major economic importance for 
us. In 1981, 1.9 per cent of our exports went. to the USSR. There-
fore there can be no ques~ion of any form of dependence. 
As regards the new gas pipeline deal between Western European 
companies and the USSR, ther~ is no likelihood of our becoming 
dependent on the USSR for energy supplies. Only 5 to 6 per 
cent of German primary energy consumption will be fed from 
Soviet sources in the late 80s~ 
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~ The gas imports will diversify our vulnerability by reducing 
our dependence on imported oil. It will help to diversify 
our energy imports, a goal agreed on by all Western in-
dustrial nations. The Federal Republic ~s a country without 
any oil of its own, without any natural gas, and without 
uranium. We have learnt the bitter lesson of being dependent 
on foreign primary energy. That is why we have to diversify 
our energy sources and our suppliers in order to reduce the 
risk. 
That is why, like Britain and France, we shall adhere to 
this deal. We cannot afford to break existing agreements. 
Thirty marks out of every one hundred marks of our gross 
national product are earned abroad. Who would still want to 
trade with us if we broke our contracts? 
Thus the subsequent extension of the embargo by the US 
Administration is a very serious matter to us. By claiming 
the right to extend American law to other territories it is 
affecting not only the interests of the European trading 
nations but also their sovereignty. The fact that this 
decision ~as taken without consultations does not make it 
easier. T~e maxim for friends especially should be: It is 
better to discuss a question without settling it than to 
settle a question without discussing it. · 
,I 
Economic Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany' 
and the United States I Texas 
I will now turn to a more pleasant subject: Texan-German 
economic relations. 
150 years ago, Friedrich Ernst, a German frpm Oldenburg who 
had emigrated to Texas, sent enthusiastic letters·to his 
fellow-countrymen urging them to follow him to the New 
World. In his letters he frequently spoke of the economic 
opportunities that Texas afforded to enterprising immigrants. 
Today, many years after those letters sent by Friedrich 
Ernst, there are a great number of economic ties between 
Texas and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
They are not only confined to traditional trade, but also 
embrace1 reciprocal direct investments. These constitute a 
special link between our economies. More and more small and 
medium-sized·companies are involved in this interlinkage of 
our countries through direct investments. With·its stable 
social and economic conditions, the Federal Republic is 
attractive for business operations in Europe, particularly 
to American companies. 
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There is one· German city with particularly close ties with 
the United States: Berlin. Admittedly, its exposed situation 
and its division are somewhat disadvantageous. However, they 
are more than offset by the tax advantages and the attrac-
tiveness of the cultural life of this dynamic city. 
I feel that it is worthwhile for any American company 
intending to establish a European subsidiary to have Berlin 
right at the top of the list. And, by the way, I naturally 
have Houston right at the top of my own list: I visited your 
city for the first time·twenty-five years ago. 
The American nation has on repeated occasions demonstrated 
its vitality and generosity. For this reason, and not solely 
by virtue of the size, of your country, your economic 
power, and the strength of your armed forces, America is a 
great nation, a superpower. Yet, as Winston Churchill once 
said, "~he price of greatness ist responsibility". 
The United States, as a consequence of its size and its 
economic strength, finds itself with the difficult task of 
leading the Atlantic Alliance. But between· sovereign States 
with democratic constitutions, the exercise of leadership 
requires consensus at every stage, at every step. Consensuo 
presupposes consultation. Both are difficult. But difficulty 
is the ex?use history never accepts. 
It often seems as though Europeans and others in the world 
do not overly like American leadership. And every so often 
the Americans do not like it either. But there is no choice: 
whether accepted or denied, whether liked or disliked, 
whether disguised or openly displayed,· whether for better or 
worse, American leadership is· unavoidable. 
It will be most beneficial if applied considerately and 
consistently - and, if at all possible, quietly as well. One 
may abdicate oneself from one's leadership; one may deny 
the global consequences of one's own economic behaviour; but 
the United States will not escape its historic responsibilities. 
